This paper presents an analysis of pension funds'
the finance literature it is argued that pension funds facing more liberal regulation regimes are more likely to perform better than pension funds facing stricter investment regimes (Chan-Lau (2005) , Davis (2002) ). We investigate empirically to which extent regulations on the pension fund industry hurt the performance of private pension funds in ECE countries.
Our analysis focuses on the pension fund markets of Poland and Hungary. We explore and compare the performance of pension funds within and between those markets, using established performance measures. A comparison of our results with studies on the performance of pension funds operating in less stringent regulatory environments enables us to draw conclusions on the implications of investment regulations for the pension funds' performance.
There is scarce, mostly speculative empirical literature discussing the effects of investment and performance regulation of pension funds on their investment behavior and their portfolio return performance. The investigations rely on simple descriptive statistics analyzing pension funds' portfolio returns and thus do not account for exposure to various types of risk that may have impact on the conclusions on the performance outcomes (World Bank (2000a,b) ).
As to the best of our knowledge, the empirical analysis on Polish pension funds by Stanko (2003) is the first study on a strongly regulated ECE market considering those factors.
However, none of the mentioned studies has accounted for the presence of diverse investment and performance regulations in these capital markets and no comparative analysis on the performance implications of these regulations has been achieved.
The paper thus contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: First, it complements the available evidence on institutional investors' portfolio performance operating in lax regulatory environments and guided by "prudent man" laws by analyzing the behavior of pension funds acting under much stricter regulations. Second, the paper will empirically contribute to the above mentioned hypothesis about the link between the strength of regulation and portfolio performance, since some of the ECE countries' regulations are stricter than others. Third, the paper will have important investment policy implications for the privately funded pension systems in ECE countries. Finally, this paper is the first to provide a comprehensive comparison of privately managed pension fund performance in ECE countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the pension fund industry and the regulations in Poland and Hungary. In section 3 the methodology used to investigate portfolio performance is outlined. Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 reviews and interprets the empirical findings. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Pension Fund Industry and Regulatory Framework in Poland and Hungary
As pointed out by Chan-Lau (2005) , the main determinants of pension funds' investment performance may be grouped into three categories: investment regulations, investment practices and the ability to diversify the portfolios abroad. Below we review those factors in the context of mandatory pension funds acting on the Polish and Hungarian markets.
The first transfer of money to Polish pension funds took place on May 19, 1999. Due to organizational, as well as financial problems, the majority of Polish pension funds started their activity on the market in June 1999. As of October 1999, the number of active funds rose from 15 to 21. Due to acquisitions and a merger it was reduced to 15 again, as of December 2004. The Polish pension fund market is highly concentrated. In terms of market share, as measured by net assets, the market can be divided into three groups: very large funds (market share higher than 20%), large funds (market share between 5% and 20%) and small funds (market share below 5%). In August 2007, the funds Commercial Union (27%) and ING (23%), representing the group of largest funds, jointly held 50% of the market share. Approximately a further quarter was held by the group of large funds that included PZU (14%) and AIG (8%). The remaining quarter of the market was distributed between 11 small funds with market share below 5% (www.knf.gov.pl).
In addition to the prudent man rules, Polish pension fund managers have to follow quan-titative investment limits regulated in the Law on Organisation and Operation of Pension Funds from August 28, 1997. Here we focus on quantitative limits imposed on investment in particular types of assets and do not review the regulations restricting the concentration of holding securities of the same issuer. The overall investment in bonds and bills issued by Treasury and National Bank of Poland is not subject to constraints. A maximum of 40% of the accumulated assets under management may be invested in shares of domestic listed companies, in addition, no more than 25% in investment funds. The investment in bank deposits and foreign assets is limited to a maximum of 20% and 5%, respectively. Investing in instruments with a low degree of security and liquidity, including derivatives, is limited to 5%. Investing into real estate is prohibited (UNFE (2000), OECD (2006) ). Table 1 Table 1 reveals that Polish pension funds diversify less than they are allowed by the quantitative investment limits. In particular, the fraction of investment in foreign assets is substantially lower than the legal limit of 5% (www.knf.gov.pl). Table 1 about here To guarantee future pension payments, the pension funds' performances are observed, evaluated and compared with the industry's average return on a regular basis by the Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Commission (KNF). Pension funds are required to guarantee a minimum rate of return on their investments. The Polish law defines this mandatory minimum as "the rate of return lower by 50% than the weighted average rate of all funds established for a given period, or the rate of return four percentage points lower than the aforesaid average, whichever is lower". The measure is calculated and announced on a quarterly basis for the previous 36-month period. A rate below the required threshold should be made up from pension funds' reserve account. If these assets will not suffice to cover the deficit, it has to be financed by the so-called Guarantee Fund, which was introduced to secure future pension payments 1 (www.knf.gov.pl).
1 Such performance regulations in combination with the high concentration of the pension fund industry in Poland can be seen as reasons for herding behaviour by Polish pension funds and to similar composition of the funds' portfolios. Voronkova and Bohl (2005) investigate this typical feature of the Polish pension fund market in detail.
Mandatory pension funds in Hungary were introduced in January 1998 as a second tier within the new three-tier pension system (World Bank (2007) and four large Hungarian pension funds, holding about 80% of assets, dominated the market, whilst the very large fund held 25% on its own. The remaining 20% of the market was held by 13 small funds (www.pszaf.hu). The oligopolistic structure of the Polish and Hungarian pension fund markets is similar to the one in the UK, where 50% of voluntary pension fund assets were held by five managing houses in 2002 ).
Investment limits in Hungary are somewhat less strict than those in Poland. Holdings in government bonds and bank deposits are not limited. Investment in domestic stocks and investment funds is limited to 50% each, investment in foreign assets is limited to 30% and investment in real estate may reach a maximum of 10%. It is prohibited for pension fund managers to invest in loans (OECD (2006)). Despite the less restrictive limits Hungarian pension fund managers diversify their portfolios even less, which becomes apparent from the data provided in Table 1 . More than 75% of assets are invested in government bonds, while only 10% of assets are held in stocks. As is the case of Polish pension funds, only a minor fraction of the overall portfolios are invested in foreign assets.
In order to ensure the security of future pensions the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) monitors the pension funds' performance. Funds are expected to achieve a minimum rate of return, which is defined as 85% of the return on long-term government bonds. Funds failing to achieve the performance target for three consecutive years may be subject to a government enquiry. However, in contrast to Poland, the Hungarian pension fund managers cannot be held liable for not delivering a minimum rate of return since their assets are not kept segregated from the participants' assets. Unlike in Poland, pension funds in Hungary are subject to long-term performance regulations: the pensions that they disburse should be at least at the level of 25% of a comparable public pension benefit on the retirement at the statutory pension age. In particular, after 15 years of participation in a pension fund, the total pension from the first and the second pillar should reach 92% of a corresponding old-style pension.
Similar to the Polish pension funds, Hungarian ones suffer from a lack of sufficiently liquid stock market. The number of stocks listed on Budapest Stock Exchange fluctuated between 49 and 66 during the sample period. However, the five most traded shares accounted for over 80% of the stock market capitalization and around 90% of its turnover (Budapest Stock Exchange (2006)). This, in combination with the present investment and performance regulations, has resulted in a very high fraction of domestic bonds in the Hungarian pension fund portfolios, which amounted to about 70% during our sample period (Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (2005)). This effectively negates the opportunity to invest up to 50% of the portfolio into equities.
Analysis of the portfolio compositions of the pension funds in the two countries shows that pension fund managers heavily invest in government bonds. Pension funds in both countries underutilize limited opportunity to invest in stocks and their investments in other allowed financial instruments are minor. Our analysis suggests that investment regulations do influence portfolio choices of the pension funds managers and may therefore affect the performance of the pension funds.
Performance Measures
To provide a first insight into the investment performance of the pension funds and their ranking Sharpe (1966) and Treynor (1965) ratios are calculated. While the Sharpe ratio considers the total risk of a portfolio, the Treynor ratio takes the systematic risk into account.
A well diversified portfolio features a total risk equal to the systematic risk. Thus, through a comparison of the two ratios, a rough estimate of the diversification capability of the managers is possible. An identical ranking of the performance measures indicates a high diversification capability.
Detailed information about the portfolio structure of the individual funds is available for a limited period due to the access to general public information only. Therefore, the analysis is constrained to established unconditional performance measures based on the CAPM. Jensen's (1968) regression:
is used to model the unconditional market model. r it is the return of pension fund i at time t, r f t the risk-free rate and r mt the return of the market portfolio. The coefficient α i indicates the Jensen's α of fund i, the coefficient β i denotes its beta. While a positive and significant α indicates a superior risk-adjusted performance of a fund, a negative value reports an inferior performance assuming that the fund manager potentially does not show stock selection ability, but timing ability (Cesari and Panetta (2002) ). Stock selection ability refers to the allocation of funds' assets within different investment instruments, whereas market timing concerns changes of the funds' asset allocation across those instruments.
In addition to stocks, pension funds' portfolios contain bonds which have to be taken into account. This can be achieved by estimating a two-index model, including stock and bond returns:
The structure of the two-index model can be justified using two different considerations. If a fund is composed out of three portfolios (stocks, bonds and risk-free assets), its return is the weighted average of the returns given by the previously defined portfolios.
indicates the sensitivity of fund i excess return to a change of the excess return of the stock index (bond index). Given the two beta coefficients the return of a fund is interpreted as its excess return compared to the combination of the stock and bond excess returns. α i indicates the additive value achieved through active management compared to a passive investment strategy, subject to the same risk (Elton et al. (1993) ). Yet, the model may also be seen as a two-factor equilibrium model, with the stock benchmark and the bond benchmark being the factors.
In both models (1) and (2), Jensen's α is affected by the information available to the manager. Exclusive availability of security-specific information leaves the measure unbiased.
However, if the management resorts to timing information, its value is generally biased downwards (Cesari and Panetta (2002) ). In order to capture possible market timing ability of fund managers we apply the approaches by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) . The Treynor-Mazuy approach is based on the idea that managers are able to predict the market trend and the extent of future excess returns. Thus, a fund manager adapts the beta of the fund continuously to his forecasted market trend. The fraction of the market portfolio held by the managers increases (decreases) when they expect the general stock market to rise (fall). In order to capture the timing ability, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) add the squared excess return of the market portfolio to the basic Jensen regression:
γ i = 0 indicates no timing ability, andγ i > 0 that the manager has access to and successfully uses timing information, while α i measures the share of the fund's performance achieved through selectivity. The contribution to the performance of a fund achieved by timing ability corresponds to the product of the γ coefficient and the variance of the excess market return σ 2 erm . The sum of the selection contribution and the timing contribution is equal to the total performance. The Treynor-Mazuy approach may only detect timing ability, the structure of the estimated model complies with the managers' timing ability. Using a multi-beta-strategy or the three-factor model by Fama and French (1993) may solve this shortcoming (Prather and Middleton (2006) ).
The Henriksson-Merton approach (1981) is based on the idea that managers use forecasts of excess market return for the following period, and adjust the beta accordingly. The product of the excess market return and a dummy variable is added to the basic Jensen regression:
The dummy variable D t takes the value 0 if (r mt − r f t ) > 0 and -1 if (r mt − r f t ) ≤ 0. A positive value of γ i indicates that the manager has timing ability. The Henriksson-Merton approach regards time-varying beta-factors of the Jensen model as evidence for timing activity. However, an instability of this risk-measure is not necessarily due to timing activities.
Another critical assumption of the approach is that managers only take the forecasted trend of the market return into account and not the absolute level of the excess return in order to determine the beta. The performance achieved by timing and selectivity may be biased, if their behavior does not correspond to the assumptions of the model.
Since we are not interested in the fund-specific performance of the pension funds, but rather in the performance of the whole sector the models are estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). Given the the small samples, pooling information across funds has the potential advantage of gaining power compared to estimates based on a fund-by-fund analysis (Chevalier and Ellison (1999) ). We correct the standard errors by using the method proposed by Newey and West (1987) with a lag length of three in order to account for possible heteroscedasticiy and serial correlation. The statistical inference is strengthened by calculating bootstrapped standard errors, based on a resample of the residuals with 10,000
replications. 
Empirical Findings and Comparison with Existing Literature
Sharpe and Treynor ratios for the Polish pension funds are presented in Table 2 . As the returns of the pension funds are similar to the level of the t-bill rates, the absolute values of the performance ratios are small. The ratios are mainly positive and have similar rankings.
Indeed, they differ in some cases, but those minor differences may be neglected since the correlation between the ranking values is high. This result suggests diversification ability of fund managers. By comparing the survived and the discontinued funds it becomes apparent that all discontinued funds performed worse than the survived funds. The Treynor ratios based on the WIG and the WIG20 are highly correlated indicating robust results. The estimated performance measures for Polish pension funds based on the CAPM, presented in Table 4 in Panel (A), support the conclusions drawn from the Sharpe and
Treynor ratios. The estimated α coefficients of the Jensen model are positive and significant, indicating that the funds' management created an additional value compared to a passive investment strategy. The funds outperform the market by 3.71% and 2.11% per annum using the WIG20 and the WIG, respectively 3 . The coefficients of the two-index model largely support the above findings. As the WIG does account for dividends, while the WIG20 does not, the difference in the estimates is not only due to the included stocks. Table 4 Managers tend to hold stocks of "blue chip" companies, while they trade those of small and medium size companies. Their intention is to profit by a long-term-investment in "blue chips"
and by timing the rising and falling prices of the remaining stocks of small and medium size companies, simultaneously. This finding is in line with the fact that "blue chips" constitute a significant proportion of the funds' portfolios. Such portfolio structure is attributed to the existence of minimum required rate of return and the resulting security orientation of the managers (KNF (2007)).
The estimation results for the groups of survived and discontinued Polish pension funds in Panel (B) and (C) of Table 4 support our findings by the Sharpe and the Treynor ratio evidencing a worse performance of discontinued pension funds. While the estimated performance measures for survived pension funds are similar to those of the whole market, the performance measures of the discontinued funds are different. According to the Jensen and the two-index model, discontinued funds are not able to beat the market. In addition, the results of both timing models deny the managers of discontinued funds any timing ability.
We do not find evidence confirming the statement by Chan-Lau (2005) and Davis (2002) that the performance of pension funds is adversely affected by the strict regulatory framework, in regard to the Polish pension funds. Although our sample period is larger, our estimation results for the Polish pension fund market are in line with the findings of Stanko (2003). Thus, our results seem to be robust with respect to the sample length, showing that Polish pension funds continuously outperform the market at a constant level in the long-run.
When looking at the Table 5, as the values ofγ-coefficients are close to zero and not significant. This outcome is similar to the estimations for the Polish market when the WIG20 is used, as BUX and WIG20 are official blue-chip stock indices although they differ in terms of size and number of stocks included. Table 5 about here A number of reasons may cause this evidence of underperformance by Hungarian pension funds. The relatively short sample period and the dynamics of the t-bill rate might lead to the negative and insignificant α-estimates. Hungarian pension fund managers face an illiquid and small stock market, which limits their diversification opportunities. The usage of returns on government bonds as a benchmark in the Hungarian performance regulation further affects the portfolio diversification, as it keeps security oriented managers from investing into assets other than bonds. As a result, Hungarian pension fund members do not benefit from the profit opportunities available on their domestic stock market (Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, 2007) . Such an investment strategy may contribute to a reduction of the fund returns. Finally, the legislative framework itself has been subject to numerous changes, providing additional uncertainties for managers and participants (World Bank, 2007) . We therefore cannot rule out that performance regulations might have an adverse effect on the performance of the funds operating on the Hungarian market, aggravated by the underdeveloped local stock market and instability of the regulation itself.
A comparison of the performance of pension funds active in the strongly regulated markets of Poland and Hungary with such active in less regulated markets shall give evidence on whether investment limits and performance regulations in fact harm the performance of pension funds. We chose the UK market for a comparison, as UK pension fund managers face probably the fewest externally imposed constraints. This market is, similar to the Polish market, highly concentrated, providing a proper basis for a reasonable comparison. Besides the UK pension fund market, the US market is much less regulated than the Polish and Hungarian ones. The empirical findings by Christopherson et al. (1998) and Lakonishok et al. (1992) on the performance of pension funds operating on the US market support our findings. Despite US pension funds face a less regulated framework, they show a poor performance in comparison to Polish pension funds. Our findings on Polish pension funds that a large amount of net assets does not necessarily guarantee the highest perfor-mance, are in line with the results of and Lakonishok et al. (1992) for the UK and the US market, respectively. A comparison of the empirical findings for the UK, US, Polish and Hungarian pension fund markets with respect to the regulatory framework supports our previous finding. The argument of Chan-Lau (2005) and Davis (2002) of regulations having a negative effect on the funds' performances can not be confirmed.
Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper is to investigate the influence of a strict regulatory framework on the performance of pension funds active on ECE markets. We apply established performance measures for a comparative analysis. We find evidence of outperformance by Polish pension funds and significant underperformance by Hungarian pension funds, although Hungarian pension funds face less restrictive investment limits than their Polish counterparts.
Investment limits and performance regulations influence the investment decisions of pension funds. The impact on a fund's performance, however, depends on the type of the performance evaluation benchmark used by the regulation. In Poland it leads to similar portfolio compositions of the managers, while in Hungary it leads to an exceeding investment into government securities.
The international comparison suggests that Polish pension funds, despite facing the strictest regulatory framework compared to Hungary, the UK and the US, outperform the market, while pension funds active on the compared markets are, in general, not able to beat the market. Thus, the argument given in Chan-Lau (2005) and Davis (2002) that pension funds facing no investment restrictions are more likely to perform better than funds facing stricter regulations can not be supported, relying on our empirical findings. (2006)). The actual shares of assets in the portfolios of Polish pension funds are calculated using data provided by www.knf.gov.pl. The shares of assets in Hungarian pension funds portfolios are calculated using the arithmetic average for all pension funds for the period of 1998 to 2004 given in the dataset provided by the PSZAF. The maximum length of the sample period is 1998q1 until 2004q4. All pension funds are considered. For the calculation of the Treynor ratio the BUX is used as market portfolio. Bold figures indicate a change in the ranking. The Treynor ratio of pension fund three is an outlier. This results from a covariance of the excess return of this funds and the corresponding excess return of the market portfolio being close to 0. The table presents the pooled OLS estimates of the CAPM regressions based on the WIG20 and the WIG as benchmarks for each model and group. All models are estimated with Newey-West standard errors. The partitioning into groups is the following: In (A) all funds are included, in (B) only survived funds including late-starters are considered and in (C) only funds that started their activity later than June 1999 and quit the market prior to July 2005 are considered. *,**,*** represent estimates significant at 10%, 5%, 1 %, respectively. The table presents the pooled estimation results of the CAPM-models for the Hungarian pension funds with the BUX used as benchmark. All models are estimated with Newey-West standard errors. *,**,*** represent estimates significant at 10%, 5%, 1 %, respectively.
